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Abstract
In recent years, research found that populism employed a new strategy by using nostalgia, a sentimental longing for the
past, as a communication tool to persuade citizens to support their political agendas. In populist campaigns, nostalgia
is used to affectively link (alleged) crises with longing for a cherished past. In this article, we applied a mixed-methods
approach to understand how populists exploit nostalgia in their communication and how nostalgic rhetoric has the poten-
tial to persuade people to support their claims. In Study 1, we conducted a case study based on a qualitative content analy-
sis of Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) online election campaign in the 2019 Thuringia election in East Germany. The analysis
revealed that the campaign was built around the nostalgic narrative of the 1989 peaceful revolution as a proud historical
moment for former German Democratic Republic citizens while at the same time creating a sense of crisis supposedly
caused by false post-reunification politics. To further investigate the persuasiveness of nostalgia, Study 2 used a statement
from the campaign and found that participants tended to agree more with populist statements if they contained nostalgic
rhetoric (compared to non-nostalgic populist and control rhetoric). These findings suggest that right-wing populists can
effectively exploit nostalgia and that it may ‘sugarcoat’ populist messages.
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1. Introduction
Nostalgia, a sentimental longing for the past, has become
an omnipresent phenomenon in popular culture. For
many, it is entertaining and inspiring to nostalgically
engage in fond memories evoked by media (Daneels,
Bowman, Possler, &Mekler, 2021; Kay,Mahoney, & Shaw,
2017). However, nostalgia is not an exclusive asset in
the entertainment business but also attracts notice in
politics. Since the 1990s, the use of nostalgia as a polit-
ical tool has become a widespread in Eastern Europe
after the transition to democracy and market economy
resulted in many unfulfilled promises and a longing for
a better future (Velikonja, 2009). Realizing the potential
of this frustration, politicians made use of the fact that
post-Soviet nostalgia “[f]ueled by dissatisfactionwith the
present, creates and feeds the image of the perfect past”
(Velikonja, 2009, p. 538). This is a rather recent exam-
ple in a long history of political uses of the past across
the political spectrum. Nostalgia has also proven itself to
be compatible with the conservative politics of the right,
defending traditions and values against change (Bourke,
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2018, p. 453; Tannock, 1995, p. 455). The continuum
between constructive and ‘dark’ uses of nostalgia varies
depending on the political stance of those who employ
it (Bonnett, 2010). As we will show, those with radical or
extreme agendas tend to exploit nostalgia for emotional
manipulation to either stabilize or mobilize against the
status quo (Karakaya, 2020).
Subsequently, we focus on the ‘dark’ end of the con-
tinuum. In recent years, nostalgia’s persuasive poten-
tial as an affective communication tool was also discov-
ered by modern right-wing populists across the globe
(Betz & Johnson, 2004). The most prominent examples
date back to 2016, culminating in the slogans “Make
America great again” (Trump, US presidential campaign)
and “Take back control” (Independence Party, UK Brexit
campaign; Campanella & Dassù, 2019). These campaigns
are representative of a trend that illustrates the strategic
use of nostalgia as a means of persuasion in populist pol-
itics (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). Hence, nostalgia paved
at least some of the way towards the success of contem-
porary populism in modern democracies.
While there has been some case-based work on the
relationship between populism and nostalgia in several
countries, such as the US, the UK, and Turkey (Browning,
2019; Karakaya, 2020; Kenny, 2017), research on how
nostalgia is used in mediated populist communication
and nostalgia’s persuasive potential in populistmessages
is rather scarce. To contribute to these questions, we
conducted a qualitative content analysis (Study 1) inves-
tigating the use of nostalgia in the online campaign of
the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany
(AfD) during the Thuringia federal state election in 2019.
Building on an example from the online campaign mate-
rial, we then followed with an experiment (Study 2)
examining the persuasive potential of nostalgia in state-
ments about safety in public places. Our findings show
how nostalgia is used in the campaign to create a nos-
talgically informed vision of the future combined with
rigid in- and out-group thinking in times of crisis. By cre-
ating positive emotions that are evoked when individ-
uals fondly remember the past, nostalgia may work to
‘sugarcoat’ populist messages that would—otherwise—
be rejected more easily.
2. ‘Dark’ Uses of Nostalgia in Right-Wing Populism
Nostalgia is neither political nor ‘dark’ per se: it can
be pleasurable, fun, social, and entertaining. There has
been extensive research in recent years that under-
scores the cultural, social, and psychological benefits
of nostalgia as a productive engagement with the past
(Menke, 2017; Wildschut, Sedikides, Routledge, & Arndt,
2006; Wulf, Bonus, & Rieger, 2019). Research in social
psychology shows that whenever people feel nostal-
gic by remembering meaningful events from their life,
they usually feel connected to their peers (Wildschut,
Sedikides, Routledge, Arndt, & Cordaro, 2010), develop
a sense of meaning in life (Van Tilburg, Igou, & Sedikides,
2013), and find continuity in their biography (Sedikides
et al., 2016).
At the same time, it is positive elements such as
these that make nostalgia’s exploitation for political pur-
poses so dangerous. Svetlana Boym (2001) exposed this
ambivalence of nostalgia in her well-established differen-
tiation between “restorative nostalgia” that aims at rein-
stating a lost past as an absolute, dead serious truth and
“reflective nostalgia” that allows one to long for the past
as an inspirational resource to engage with the progress
of time and the changes that come with it. Regarding
the former, Boym observed that “[restorative] nostalgia
characterizes national and nationalist revivals all over the
world” (2001, p. 41) and warned that “[t]he mix of nos-
talgia and politics can be explosive” (2007, p. 10). To fur-
ther investigate their relationship, it is important to out-
line which features of nostalgia are compatible with core
elements of right-wing populism.
2.1. Nostalgia as an Affective Tool in Right-Wing
Populist Communication
The extensive literature on populism shows that there
is a long-lasting debate about what populism is and
what its features are. We will not go further into the
many conceptual differences between populism as a zeit-
geist, thin-ideology, political style, pathology, form of
discourse, or strategy (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Mudde,
2004; Stanley, 2008), nor into the literature of all ele-
ments of populism, such as the refusal of established
political practices and norms, a tendency to authority,
and a fascinationwith charismatic leaders (Taggart, 2004,
pp. 275–276). Instead, we will focus on those elements
constituting the affective dimensions of right-wing pop-
ulism which we consider particularly relevant to under-
stand why nostalgia is such a powerful affective commu-
nication tool.
First, right-wing populism promotes a narrative of
a world in crisis to create a sense of loss of control.
Typical scenarios include economic decline, moral decay,
and threatening cultural shifts (Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Taggart, 2004, p. 275). This materializes in a “loss frame”
which suggests a loss of status, purpose, and wealth due
to the devastating impact of a crisis to create “onto-
logical insecurity,” i.e., a loss of trust in the world and
one’s place in it (Steele & Homolar, 2019, p. 219). When
right-wing populists actively promote such a perception,
this fosters feelings of anxiety, fear, and discomfort with
the present.
In nostalgia research, this emotional state, rooted
in a (perceived) crisis and experiences of disruption
and loss, has long been identified as an important trig-
ger of nostalgia (Davis, 1977; Pickering & Keightley,
2006). Nostalgia can be a way of coping with change
and thereby can be addressed in the right-wing pop-
ulist vision that capitalizes on the previously fostered
‘ontological insecurity’ to restore a sense of identity,
self-continuity, and security (Smeekes, Wildschut, &
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Sedikides, in press). The solution presented by pop-
ulists pictures a nostalgically informed vision for the
future that overcomes the criticized status quo and
promises to reinstate past certainties (Wohl, Stefaniak,
& Smeekes, 2020, p. 484). A series of three experimental
studies by Lammers and Baldwin (2020) indicates that,
indeed, nostalgia supports right-wing populist rhetoric if
the depicted past suggests that things used to be eas-
ier. The authors conclude that “[i]t is easy to see why
right-wing populism may be linked to collective nostal-
gia. Many of the slogans used by right-wing populist par-
ties appeal to this collective emotion by calling for a
return to the past” (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020, p. 944).
The ‘darkness’ of this lies in the exploiting of the pow-
erful affective link between the asserted state of cri-
sis, the induced ontological insecurity, and the promise
to retrieve a romanticized past which, however, never
existed in the first place (Kenny, 2017).
Recent case studies show how nostalgia works
in right-wing populist campaigns: For the Brexit cam-
paign, Browning (2019, p. 235) describes that populists
targeted the so-called ‘left behind’ who already felt
“economically, socially and ontologically insecure” and
attributed their situation to “globalization, economic
transformation, multiculturalism and immigration” as
well as unbearable EU regulation. The Brexit campaign
then promised a “returning to a national homeland
associated with community cohesion, job security and
belonging” and a renewed recognition of the British
nation (Browning, 2019, p. 235). Kenny (2017, p. 527)
observed the same affective tropes of crisis and for-
mer glory within Trump’s campaign, indicating that the
outlined scheme is based on a shared discursive pat-
tern. Drawing from her research on Ottoman nostalgia
in Turkish populism, Karakaya (2020, p. 153) also points
out that populist campaigns share rhetoric that connects
sufficiently to restorative nostalgia by dividing the world
into a binary of a cherished past and a despised present.
In all three examples, populists intentionally communi-
cated this superior past rather vaguely to allow individ-
uals to fill the gaps with their own imagined version
of the collective past. In these campaigns, right-wing
populists capitalized on the “mobilizing emotional force”
of nostalgia that evokes a bonding passion and encour-
ages support of the common agenda (Karakaya, 2020,
p. 152). The research shows many commonalities, yet
each populist campaign is adjusted to the “local nostal-
gias” anchored in different national and historical con-
texts (Karakaya, 2020, p. 153).
2.2. Drawing on Nostalgia for In- and Out-Group
Construction
Nostalgia can turn even ‘darker’ when the vision for soci-
ety only caters to the needs of a specific in-group and
disregards or threatens those declared members of out-
groups. That the construction of the in-group entails a
strong affective dimension has been stressed by Taggart
in the notion of the ‘heartland.’ Even though Taggart
did not explicitly label the ‘heartland’ nostalgic, core fea-
tures are present in his description:
The heartland is a construction of an ideal world but
unlike utopian conceptions, it is constructed retro-
spectively from the past—it is, in essence, a past-
derived vision projected onto the present as that
which has been lost….It is a diffuse vision, blurred
around the edges but no less powerful for that. It is no
doubt romanticised and a profoundly ahistorical con-
ception but, again, no less powerful for that. (Taggart,
2004, p. 274)
In right-wing populism, the ‘heartland’ only comprises
citizens who are considered members of the country’s
native ethnic group. The ‘us vs. them’ mentality is baked
into the nostalgic vision of a nation for the natives as
it was before the out-groups supposedly corrupted it
(Smeekes, 2015). The in-group is constructed around
the notion of the ‘common man’ who is portrayed as
the unjust victim of change caused by non-native out-
groups, such as foreigners and refugees, and powerful
elites, such as politicians and progressive intellectuals
(Mudde, 2004, p. 543). It is only the idealized past of
this targeted in-group that right-wing populists promise
to restore, explicitly excluding minorities and elites who
are considered dissidents (Hameleers, 2018). Hence, the
danger of exploiting nostalgia for the ‘heartland’ lies
in relating the nostalgic sentiments of the in-group to
the suggested question of why things have changed
for the worse for them and who is responsible for it
(Smeekes, 2015).
In their communication, populists orchestrate what
Smeekes et al. (in press) call an emotion-based ‘master-
frame’ of national nostalgia: Praising the national past
creates a sanctuary of positive emotions among recep-
tive members of this in-group. Coincidentally, they
arouse the perception that this sanctuary has been
taken which results in longing and anger about the loss
that is eventually channelled towards xenophobia and
anti-elitism. Various experiments in social psychology
support the claim that nostalgia for the own in-group’s
past leads to in-group identification and out-group prej-
udice (Smeekes, 2015; Wohl et al., 2020). In a study with
participants from 27 countries, Smeekes et al. (2018)
also demonstrated that when the in-group was under
threat, collective nostalgia increased which in turn led to
opposition towards immigrant out-groups. Finally, being
receptive of stories relating to the nation’s past as a glo-
rious time is linked to xenophobic and nationalistic atti-
tudes (Smeekes, 2015; Smeekes et al., in press). In line
with these results, it is plausible that populist attitudes
also make individuals more prone to nostalgic populist
statements. From here, we expect that nostalgic rhetoric
increases people’s agreement with populist statements
(H1) and that such agreement should depend on individ-
ual populist attitudes (H2).
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Following the literature review, we will now intro-
duce the German case we investigated in two empirical
studies on the uses of nostalgia in populism, starting by
briefly outlining the political and historical context.
3. The Thuringia Federal State Election of 2019 and
Alternative for Germany
The AfDwas founded in 2013 as a right-liberal EU-sceptic
populist party which has since then increasingly moved
to the right. In the 2019 election in the East German
federal state Thuringia, AfD and their head runner
Björn Höcke successfully mobilized 23.4% of the votes.
The party secured second place and was able to double
the result from 2014 (10.6%).
The success of AfD Thuringia is attributed to numer-
ous historical roots: After reunification, the promised
prosperity did not materialize. Furthermore, histori-
ans showed that West Germany cultivated a pedagog-
ical approach to history that condemned the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) as a regimewithout acknowl-
edging that many former GDR citizens felt that their
biographies were delegitimized and their voices were
excluded from the discourse (Saunders & Pinfold, 2013).
Even after 30 years, many old and young East Germans
report “[feelings of] social disintegration and a lack
of recognition” by West Germans (Weisskircher, 2020,
p. 620). This underpins a foundation of mistrust in
the political system and its capability to represent East
Germans’ needs. Finally, there is a comparably high level
of anti-immigrant attitudes that researchers trace back
to a lack of intercultural experiences in the GDR and
today’s East Germany, which has contributed to the suc-
cess of right-wing politics since the 1990s (Weisskircher,
2020, p. 619).
Against this backdrop, we chose to analyse the
online campaign of AfD, which carried the main slo-
gan “Wende_2.0” (Turnaround_2.0, authors’ translation).
It refers to the 1989 turning point of the peaceful revolu-
tion and taps into the subsequent inner-German strug-
gle of reunification. With this reference, AfD set up the
campaign around the trope of the peaceful revolution
of former GDR citizens being their glorious moment in
history that led to the overthrow of the socialist regime.
To gain insight into the populist uses of nostalgia in this
campaign, we combined a qualitative content analysis
to explore the actual nostalgic populist communication
(Study 1) with a follow-up experiment, using a message
from the campaign, to test the assumptions regarding
people’s agreement with nostalgic rhetoric (Study 2).
For the case in Study 1, we explore four research
questions:
RQ1: How was the narrative of the ‘Turnaround_2.0’
established in the campaign material?
RQ2: How was nostalgia for the ‘heartland’ used to
foster a xenophobic in- and out-group mentality?
RQ3: Howdid AfD Thuringiamake use of the nostalgic
sentiments for the peaceful turnaround of 1989 and
the ‘heartland’ to mobilize voters with their online
campaign?
RQ4: How was nostalgia tied to right-wing populist
elements in AfD’s online communication?
For the experiment in Study 2, we pose the two hypothe-
ses as derived in the theory above:
H1: Participants more strongly agree with nostal-
gic right-wing populist rhetoric compared to non-
nostalgic right-wing populist rhetoric.
H2: Populist attitudes moderate the impact of nostal-
gic rhetoric on agreement with those messages.
The studies were developed and executed together with
students in a seminar, while the final analyses of the
data were performed by the authors. Data and supple-
mentary material are available online (https://doi.org/
10.17605/OSF.IO/ZNPGT).
4. Study 1: Case Study of the AfD Online Election
Campaign
Study 1 explores the ‘dark’ uses of nostalgia in AfD’s
communication aiming at answering the first four RQs
posed above. All quotes are English translations by
the authors.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Sample and Selection Criteria
In the first phase, we chose to gather official AfD
campaign material from AfD Thuringia’s website and
Facebook accounts from the four weeks before the elec-
tion on the 27th of October 2019. We expected to find
the most unfiltered communication online because it
is there that right-wing populists are able to directly
address their followers and circumvent traditional media
(Krämer, 2017, p. 11). We only selected material that
either directly promoted the ‘Turnaround 2.0’ campaign
or included content related to the ‘heartland’ covering
topics such as family values, education, the homeland,
German identity, and immigration, because the litera-
ture indicated a clustering of nostalgic statements with
these topics. In the second phase, we only selected
paragraphs or sections for the analysis if they included
(1) (nostalgic) references to the past and at least one
populist element, such as (2) loss/crisis in the present
and/or (3) the ‘heartland’ and/or (4) anti-elitism and/or
(5) out-groups. The final sample comprised posts from
AfD Thuringia’s Facebook account (n = 24; 1,054 words),
and the Facebook account of Björn Höcke (n = 13; 2,012
words); campaign videos from AfD Thuringia’s website
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(n = 2; 3:00 min); paragraphs on migration, family val-
ues, education, culture, and security from the election
manifesto (n = 1; 3,236 words); online pamphlets on the
homeland, family values, immigration, and East-German
identity (n = 5; 6,761 words); and election campaign
posters with one-line slogans (n = 10).
4.2. Coding
The coding process followed three consecutive stages.
First, the authors created a basic coding scheme that
included the main categories deductively derived from
the theory on nostalgia and populism. This comprised
for nostalgia:
(1) Restorative nostalgia: Statements that present
the past as an ideal time that should be restored
(Boym, 2001). This can refer to either a national
past and/or a vague bygone ‘heartland’ that is
often contrasted to an inferior present (Lammers
& Baldwin, 2020; Smeekes et al., in press;
Taggart, 2004).
(2) Nostalgic sentiment: Statements that address an
emotional state related to the past or the con-
trast between the present and the past. The ‘bit-
tersweetness’ of nostalgia manifests in the expres-
sion or reflection of positive (sweet: comfort, joy,
solidarity) and negative (bitter: anger, sadness, dis-
appointment) emotions (Wildschut et al., 2006).
(3) References to the past: Statements that refer to
the historical era and events related to the GDR
and the 1989 Turnaround as well as East German’s
personal and collective memories of their every-
day life in the GDR (Saunders & Pinfold, 2013).
For populism, these were:
(1) In-group construction: Statements that emphasize
the origin of East Germans based on nativism/
nationalism and/or shared values and (nostalgic)
emotions (Smeekes, 2015).
(2) ‘Heartland’: Statements that refer to the past as
a time with specific ideals that constitute the col-
lective identity of East Germans based on family
values, shared convictions, in-group solidarity, and
native exclusivity (Taggart, 2004).
(3) Anti-elitism: Statements in which West German
politicians are made responsible for the supposed
crisis within East Germany and Thuringia. Criticism
claiming the failure of democracy due to the
corruption of democratic institutions by elites
(Mudde, 2004).
(4) Out-groups: Statements that are othering non-
native or non-East German people, such as immi-
grants, refugees (especially Muslims), or West
Germans by condemning their values, motives,
and behaviour (Smeekes, 2015; Smeekes et al.,
in press).
(5) Change/crisis: Statements that discuss social, cul-
tural, and political change in a sensational tone
as harmful for the native in-group. Usually, crises
are attributed to elites and out-groups (Inglehart
& Norris, 2016; Steele & Homolar, 2019).
(6) Loss frame: Statements that frame social, cultural,
and political change in terms of what the in-group
has lost or what has been taken away from its
members by elites or the out-group (Steele &
Homolar, 2019).
In the second stage, the coding scheme was used by
the students (n = 14; in 4 groups) to code all material
based on the principles of directed content analysis to
discover patterns and themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005;
Mayring, 2014) using the qualitative data analysis soft-
ware f4analyse (Dresing & Pehl, 2020). Each group used
the same initial coding scheme and inductively added
codes to the main categories that covered the differ-
ent sub-dimensions found within the empirical mate-
rial, such as a differentiation of in-group and out-groups
regarding the sub-dimensions of culture, nationality, eth-
nicity, religion, and political tradition or the ‘heartland’
as a shared culture, a geographical location, or the nature
of the homeland. In the third stage, the four coding
schemes of the groups were fused into one final com-
prehensive version by the authors. This version was then
employed by one of the authors to code the material.
This coding was finally reviewed by both authors and
compared to the students’ coding for reference. Only
minor adjustments followed this step. We subsequently
present our results based on this coding and the patterns
and themes that were identified in AfD’s communication
across the material of the sample.
4.3. The ‘Dark’ in Technicolor Communication
In this section, we will demonstrate how AfD estab-
lished the narrative of the ‘Turnaround_2.0’ in the cam-
paign material (RQ1) that became the major reoccur-
ring theme. Besides the digital aesthetic of the ‘2.0,’
this is a reference to the German peaceful revolution
of 1989 overthrowing the GDR regime. Thus, the slo-
gan addresses an achievement of courageous former
GDR-citizens and nostalgically celebrates their role in this
historical event. We will subsequently show how nostal-
gia for this glorious moment was used by AfD to mobi-
lize East Germans for yet another turnaround at the bal-
lot boxes.
As Figure 1 shows, the outlined common nostalgic
theme is present in technicolour campaign videos avail-
able on AfD Thuringia’s website and on Facebook. In this
video (AfD Thuringia, 2019a), the “1989” reference with
protesting people in the background is followed by the
lettering “peaceful revolution.” It is then pointed out that
“30 years after” the former GDR citizens fought in the
revolution they have been “disappointed.” Title stories
of West German newspapers about East Germany are
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Figure 1. Six screenshots taken by the authors from the AfD Facebook video “Let us take our country back! #AfD.” Source:
AfD Thuringia (2019a).
used as a symbol for the arrogance ofWest Germans and
‘their’media. Theblue screenshots on the right show two
statements from the video arguing that the present is
even worse than the GDR regime: “41% say: Less free-
dom of speech than in the GDR” and “Worse protection
from crime than before the turnaround.”
The combination of nostalgia and populist elements
also becomes explicit in AfD’s election manifesto titled
“My home, my Thuringia,” which was available on the
website (AfD Thuringia, 2019b). It includes statements
such as: “It is with great concern that we observe that in
recent years the liberal democracy for which the people
fought during the peaceful revolution has increasingly
been transformed into a spectator democracy with fea-
tures of an ideological regime ” (AfD Thuringia, 2019b,
p. 7). This sentence prototypically represents most ele-
ments of the populist scheme: crisis, anti-elitism, and
nostalgia. Other equal examples in the online campaign
are a comic and a radio commercial visualized in a video.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the cartoonish style resembles
harmless children’s media with an entertaining appeal.
However, beyond the playful aesthetic, there are layers
of nostalgic narratives combined with ‘dark’ elements,
such as the scenario of the crisis and the blaming of
West German elites, the government, and left progres-
sives. In the cartoon, Björn Höcke (top left) praises the
former GDR citizens for their bravery in the peaceful rev-
olution while the situation in Germany is compared to
the oppression during the GDR.
In the party’s campaign newspaper and on Facebook,
we also found similar techniques to create a sense
of crisis and evoke nostalgic sentiments. The hashtag
#VollendeDieWende (#AccomplishTheTurnaround) was
used for most Facebook posts and an encouraging tone
Figure 2. Screenshot of AfD comic “Fed up with bloc par-
ties.” Source: AfD Thuringia (2019c).
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was often employed to mobilize voters: “30 years after
the peaceful revolution, it is time for a revolution at the
ballot box ” (AfD Thuringia, 2019d).
Finally, on the campaign posters, there were many
motivational slogans related to the same nostalgic trope
combined with attacks towards West German elites:
“Turnaround_2.0: Write history! 1989–2019 Complete
the turnaround,” “Turnaround_2.0: They had 30 years!,”
and “We wanted freedom and got an eco-dictatorship!”
(AfD Thuringia, 2019e).
4.4. When the In-Group Nostalgia Turns into Out-Group
Xenophobia
Additional to the ‘Turnaround_2.0’ narrative, we will
subsequently demonstrate how the campaign also fos-
tered an in- and out-group mentality (RQ2). Xenophobia
is present in communication across different media
employed in the campaign. In the video screenshots
provided in Figure 3, there is an explicit focus on the
‘heartland’ that evokes nostalgia for the nuclear family
living in the countryside. The countryside is portrayed
as the place to return to nature, get a good education,
and live a secure life based on traditional values. Living
in the multicultural city is contrasted by a Muslim fam-
ily comprised of a man with two wives in burkas, accom-
panied by the word “Sharia.” The video concludes with
the claim that Thuringia has changed and needs to be
restored: “Togetherwe accomplish the turnaround” (AfD
Thuringia, 2019f). The German flag, omnipresent in all
campaignmaterial, is additionally used as a demarcation
between the natives and those regarded as cultural and
ethnic out-groups.
In the party’s electionmanifesto and thematic online
pamphlets, nostalgic narratives were embedded in their
argumentation for future ‘heartland’ policies. The party
claimed their central concern is “to preserve, protect,
educate, and promote the rich culture of our home-
land” because “[f]or Thuringian AfD, cultural life is both
the basis and expression of our identity” (AfD Thuringia,
2019b, p. 80). This particularly concerns the claim that
the nuclear family is under threat because “[v]arious
forces in politics, the economy, and society are work-
ing against parenthood and thus against the family” (AfD
Thuringia, 2019g, p. 15). This is mixed with xenopho-
bic positions when the party argues that immigrants
exploit the welfare system, are criminals, and are used
by the government to tackle the superannuation of the
German population. AfD claims that this results in “con-
siderable disadvantages for the ancestral population”
(AfD Thuringia, 2019b, p. 50) while the party “pursues
a family policy that aims to enable the German people
to reproduce themselves in the long term from within
themselves” (AfD Thuringia, 2019g, p. 33).
Höcke painted a particularly dark picture of Germany
when he wrote on Facebook:
Mass migration from the Far East and Africa, Islamic
extremism, the decay of domestic security, rise in
crime, rule by Arab clans, general brutalization and
neglect; the Euro crisis, expropriation of savers by
a zero-interest policy of the ECB, the destruction
Figure 3. Four screenshots taken by the authors from AfD video “Radio commercial of AfD for the Thuringia federal state
election on 27.10.” Source: AfD Thuringia (2019f).
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of the German automobile industry, destruction of
jobs; the disfigurement of the landscape by wind
turbines, increases in electricity prices, poverty in
old age—these are the consequences of a misguided
policy that is no longer guided by benevolence.
(Höcke, 2019)
This quote demonstrates how the claimed crises are tied
to specific out-groups and elites while at the same time
suggesting concern for the needs of the ‘common man’
and evoking nostalgia for the loss of the traditional norm
of benevolence.
4.5. Nostalgia as an Affective Tool for Mobilization
Based on the examples that illustrated how nostalgia
manifested in the campaign (RQ1 and RQ2), we will now
elaborate further on how AfD Thuringia made use of
the nostalgic sentiment for the peaceful turnaround of
1989 and the ‘heartland’ in their online campaign (RQ3).
At first appearance, the previous analysis showed that
AfD employed the typical nostalgic populist scheme that
has already been described in the literature by Smeekes
et al. (in press), Karakaya (2020), and Kenny (2017), yet
there were also insightful deviations.
The claimed crises of democracy and German
national identity fit the known conventional populist
strategy. Here, however, nostalgia was used for two very
different purposes. Nostalgia for the 1989 turnaround
was particularly exploited to mobilize East Germans for a
second peaceful revolution aka the ‘Turnaround_2.0’ at
the ballot box. By comparing the oppressive GDR regime
to the present political circumstances, the urgent need
for a ‘Turnaround_2.0’ was suggested. This nostalgia was
not about a superior historical era but about the proud
collective memory of one outstanding moment in time.
The ‘Turnaround_2.0’ was portrayed as the only solution
to once more change the course of history and return to
a state in which there is potential for a better future.
The second type of nostalgia in the material con-
cerned the German ‘heartland.’ This nostalgia was used
to design a long-term right-wing political vision based on
an agenda catering to the native East German in-group
longing for ontological security. AfD constructed the idea
of a ‘heartland’ around traditional values and the native
descent of the in-group rather than around a specific
historical past. This allowed them to disregard the GDR
and to instead create a vision based on German national-
ism and identity that potentially captures a broader audi-
ence. The examples from the material show that immi-
grants and refugees, i.e., particularly Muslims, as well
as left progressives were portrayed as those threatening
the ‘heartland.’
The examples presented in our analysis also show
hownostalgia was tied to right-wing populist elements in
AfD’s communication (RQ4):Most importantly, it was the
fear of crisis and loss, anti-elitism, and xenophobia that
were present in combination with nostalgia. The nos-
talgia for the peaceful revolution mostly made use of
the crisis trope and the anti-elitism regarding the state
of democracy. The nostalgia for the ‘heartland’ focused
more on German identity based on values, ethnicity,
and xenophobia. In sum, these populist and nostalgic
elements were strategically combined for two different
purposes: the first to affectively mobilize against the
political system in the election and the second to mobi-
lize for a right-wing political agendabased onnationalism
and xenophobia.
5. Study 2: Experiment on Nostalgic Populist
Statement’s Persuasiveness
Based on the findings of Study 1, we decided to con-
duct an experimentwithmaterial from theAfD campaign




We recruited 235 participants via social media post-
ings and student mailing lists at a large university in
Germany. We excluded 62 participants who did not fin-
ish the questionnaire leaving a final sample of N = 173.
The dropout rate did not differ between experimental
groups. The average age of our sample was M = 28.39
(SD = 13.20) with 64.5% identifying as female (1 par-
ticipant as non-binary). The sample showed an over-
all high level of education: 46.5% had a high school
diploma, 23.5% a university degree, 13.5% had finished
training in a skilled trade (abgeschlossene Lehre), only
16.5% had a lower-school degree (or had not yet finished
school). Participants were randomly assigned to condi-
tions. Analyses suggested that randomization was suc-
cessful as neither age [F(2,165) = 0.43, n.s.] nor gender
distribution [𝜒2(2) = 0.74, n.s.] differed between groups.
5.1.2. Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants first
answered general questions about their political inter-
ests. Afterwards, participants answered a questionnaire
on their populist attitudes before reading one of three
statements (control, populist, and populist nostalgic) on
safety in public places. After reading, participants were
asked for their agreement with the statement, about the
topic of the statement, and whether they thought the
statement was objective or sensational. After providing
demographic variables, participants were debriefed.
5.1.3. Measures
If not stated differently, all scales were measured on
a 5-point scale (1 = do not agree at all; 5 = strongly
agree). We measured populist attitudes using 12 items,
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part of which were taken from Akkerman, Mudde, and
Zaslove’s (2014) populist attitude scale. The scale con-
tains different facets subsumed under the umbrella of
populism (populism, [anti-]elitism, and [anti-]diversity),
we decided to use an overall index of all three dimen-
sions (M = 3.07, SD = 0.65, 𝛼 = 0.84). For the full
translated scale, see Table S1 in the Supplementary
File (https://osf.io/fm5rg). Participants did not differ
regarding overall populist attitudes between conditions,
F(2,170) = 1.28, n.s.
We assessed the objectivity of the shown statement
with two items (“The statement was objective” and
“The statement was sensational”). These two items cor-
related adequately with each other (M= 2.21, SD= 1.01,
Spearman-Brown = 0.61). We further measured agree-
ment with the statement with a single item (“Please
indicate your agreement to this statement”; M = 2.38,
SD = 1.15).
5.1.4. Stimulus Selection
Drawing from Study 1, we selected one statement from
AfD’s campaign newspaper claiming that safety in public
spaces has decreased dramatically compared to the past.
As it is typical populist rhetoric, this original statement
also contained colloquial and sensational speech (e.g.,
“Kriminalitätskloake,” literally a “cesspool of criminal-
ity”). For the statements and adaptations used in Study 2,
see Appendix A in the Supplementary File. Participants in
the non-nostalgic populist group read the original pop-
ulist statement but we cut the part that referred to the
past. The nostalgic populist group was shown the same
statement, but it comprised passages that emphasized
a dramatic change compared to the past. To enhance
the nostalgic sentiment, a sentence was added by the
authors stating that in the past, children could be care-
free when playing outside and one did not have to
drive them to the kindergarten. The control group was
shown a statement that presented the statement more
objectively. For this purpose, we cut sensational lan-
guage (e.g., “cesspool of criminality”), the reference to
change compared to the past, and the nostalgic sen-
tence about carefree children. The manipulation check
shows that participants in the neutral statement condi-
tion (M = 2.72, SD = 0.97) perceived the statement as
more objective than in the populist nostalgic (M = 2.08,
SD= 1.03) and populist (M= 1.89, SD= 0.86) conditions,
F(2,170) = 11.33, p < 0.001.
5.2. Results
Zero-Order correlations of the measured variables for
the total sample as well as for all conditions can be found
in Table S2 in the Supplementary File (https://osf.io/
fm5rg). To assess whether participants differed in their
agreement with the statements (H1), we conducted an
ANOVA with statement condition as independent and
agreement as dependent variable. Results show that par-
ticipants differed between conditions in agreement to
the statement, F(2,170) = 12.21, p < 0.001, 𝜂2p = 0.13.
In particular, the control statement achieved highest
agreement (M = 2.91, SE = 0.15), the populist state-
ment lowest agreement (M = 1.90, SE = 0.14), and the
nostalgic populist statement fell in between (M = 2.38,
SE = 0.14). All means differed significantly from each
other (control—nostalgic populist:ΔM= 0.52, SE = 0.20,
p = 0.033; nostalgic populist—populist: ΔM = 0.48,
SE = 0.20, p = 0.045). These findings illustrate that while
the pure populist rhetoric scored low on agreement, nos-
talgic rhetoric was able to partly ‘bolster’ rejection of
populist speech, supporting H1.
To further investigate the role of trait populist atti-
tudes in these differences (RQ5), we conducted a mod-
eration analysis using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018,
Model 1). We compared the agreement of participants
in the nostalgic populist condition with the agreement of
participants in both other conditions using condition as
a multi-categorical predictor and included trait populist
attitude as moderator. Means were centred for the con-
struction of products using the respective function in the
PROCESS macro. Results displayed in Table 1 show a sig-
nificant interaction term. People scoring high (compared
to those scoring low) on populist attitudes agreed more
strongly with the nostalgic compared to both the control
and the non-nostalgic populist statements. These find-
ings support H2, which assumed that populist attitudes
moderate the effect of nostalgic rhetoric on acceptance.
5.3. Discussion
Study 2 used one particular statement about public
safety from the election campaign and compared how
Table 1. Linear moderation model predicting agreement with the statement.
b [CI] SE B t p
Constant 2.33 [2.09, 2.57] 0.12 19.00 < 0.001
Condition 1 (nostalgic populist versus control) 0.55 [0.19, 0.90] 0.18 3.05 0.003
Condition 2 (nostalgic populist versus non-nostalgic populist) −0.39 [−0.74, −0.05] 0.17 −2.26 0.025
Populist attitudes 1.29 [0.91, 1.66] 0.19 6.84 < 0.001
Condition 1 × Populist attitudes −0.91 [−1.47, −0.36] 0.28 −3.24 0.002
Condition 2 × Populist attitudes −0.95 [−1.47, −0.43] 0.26 −3.60 < 0.001
Notes: Condition was entered as a multi-categorical predictor with the nostalgic populist condition serving as the reference group.
R2 = 0.33.
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statements with either nostalgic or non-nostalgic
populist rhetoric performed in terms of agreement.
The results show two important findings: First, the
non-nostalgic populist rhetoric performed weaker in
acceptance than the nostalgic populist rhetoric. Second,
populist attitudes were a significant moderator such
that people with strong populist attitudes (people
sovereignty, anti-elitism) rated the nostalgic populist
statement as more acceptable than those with lower
populist attitudes compared to both other conditions.
These findings illustrate that nostalgia can function
as a rhetorical tool to ‘sugarcoat’ populist messages.
While the politicalmessage and the tone of both populist
statements were similar, people agreed more strongly
with the nostalgic statement which contained aspects
such as change, and being carefree back in childhood.
Moreover, nostalgia might particularly impact those
who share populist (anti-elitism, anti-diversity) attitudes
anyway. Thus, nostalgia in populist rhetoric might work
particularly well on individuals who are already prone to
such political messages and thus works by maintaining
followers rather than addressing new voters. It has to
be kept in mind though that we only manipulated and
tested one particular (short) message. Also, there was
no nostalgic version of the control statement to attest
the main effect of nostalgic (but non-populist) rhetoric.
Our findings should therefore be taken as a complemen-
tary proof of conceptwithin a case study thatmay induce
further research. Nonetheless, these findings are note-
worthy because the major part of the sample was higher
educated and did disagree with the non-nostalgic pop-
ulist statement. Our study further aligns with previous
findings on the impact of nostalgia in the context of
right-wing populist rhetoric. As shown by Lammers and
Baldwin (2020), populist nostalgic rhetoric that focused
on a challenge that was easier in the past increased
people’s agreement with the statement. While Lammers
and Baldwin showed this in the case of political correct-
ness in generic statements, we replicated their findings
for an actual statement of AfD Thuringia’s campaign in
Germany on the topic of people’s personal safety.
6. Conclusion
The rise of populismhas revealed the vulnerability of con-
ventions in modern democracies which have been taken
for granted. In recent campaigns, right-wing populists
employed complex affective strategies to undermine
trust in democracy and non-native citizens. Nostalgia
has become a prominent feature in most of them. Our
studies examined the ‘dark’ potential of nostalgia and
showed that it is used to mobilize supporters not only
against the status quo and out-groups but also for a
vision grounded in their longing for recognition, safety,
stability, and the ‘heartland.’
Study 1 examined AfD Thuringia’s online election
campaign and discovered that the precondition of pre-
senting a nostalgically informed vision for the future is
its contrast to a present in crisis. However, this crisis is
not just depicted in its effects on the ‘common man’ but
is additionally tied to the claimed wrongdoings of elites
and out-groups. In this specific case, AfD also channelled
frustration about the fallout following reunification, eco-
nomic inequalities, and the perceived lack of recogni-
tion for East Germans. The results also show that nostal-
gia does not have to be anchored in a historical period.
Instead, it is enough to offer a moment in time that had
the potential for a better future to be realized but which
has, as yet, not materialized. One could say that it is a
nostalgia for the bygone potential that has led to the
idea of the ‘heartland.’ Finally, results also stress that
right-wing populism does not promote a bright ‘return
to the future’ for everybody as the xenophobic dimen-
sion excludes those who are not considered members of
the ‘heartland.’
Study 2 built on these findings by focusing on a state-
ment about safety in public spaces from the campaign
material. The results indicate that the persuasive effects
of nostalgia exist and that they partly depend on the
populist attitudes of individuals. The populist statement
with nostalgia led to more agreement than the one with-
out nostalgic rhetoric. Moderation analyses showed that
this applies especially to those participants with stronger
populist attitudes. This suggests that nostalgia might per-
form especially well as a communicative tool to mobilize
those who are already receptive to populist messages.
However, this interpretation is preliminary and has to be
replicated in other studies.
Concerning the limitations of our framework, it is
important to emphasize that we followed an interdisci-
plinary attempt to nostalgia by integrating political com-
munication and psychological perspectives. While both
studies inform each other, the integration respected the
theoretical and methodological conditions of each field
and the subsequent shortcomings. For Study 1, the inter-
pretative, qualitative approach is limited to the online
material and therefore is neither a holistic analysis of the
whole campaign nor its mediated dissemination during
the Thuringia election. For Study 2, we only used one par-
ticular statement that is hardly applicable to the overall
rhetoric of AfD regarding external validity. We hope that
with our work we offer researchers on this intersection a
meaningful contribution thatwill help broaden the scope
of research.
We would like to conclude by highlighting that the
material of the AfD online campaign was distributed
and controlled by the party. This direct communica-
tion between the party and its supporters potentially
removes the layer of controversy we usually find in mass
media coverage of populist parties and their messages.
It is important to further investigate if there is contro-
versy about nostalgically informed visions in social media
or journalistic media that counter false promises and
manipulated emotions. Both studies show that creating
a sense of crisis usually precedes nostalgic narratives.
Therefore, disarming populism might mean first and
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foremost countering the exaggerated crisis rhetoric and
becoming aware of widespread sentiments. The poten-
tial of nostalgia might even turn ‘lucid’ when it is used
to understand what people are longing for in times
of crisis. This knowledge can contribute to solutions
facilitating cohesion in liberal democracies instead of
in- and out-group thinking such as that promoted by
right-wing populism.
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